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Ⅰ. Introduction
This study shows how the strength of
firms is dictated by the organisational mode
and economic institutions they adopt.
The key issue is the organisational mode
which the mode of coordination for the divi-
sion of labour entails, and the subsequent
cost of this coordination. Also, we will see
two pairs of modes of coordination for the di-
vision of labour and organisational modes of
firms, namely:
1. the detailed division of labour that cor-
responds to the A-firm, and
2. the social division of labour that corre-
sponds to the J-firm.
The term "A-firm" describes the stylised U.S.
mode of firms, and "J-firm" to the Japanese.
The A-firm is characterised by specialisation
of labour with clear boundary of work task,
and takes its strength in technological prod-
uct breakthroughs, or "product innovation",
hierarchically generated from the top down-
wards. In contrast, the J-firm features hori-
zontal coordination between labour at the
work front, and its strength lies in the incre-
mental innovation of existing products, or
"process innovation", generated from bottom
upwards. Moreover, we will examine eco-
nomic institutions, or employment and fi-
nancial systems, suitedto supporting the
organisational modes.
Ⅱ. The Division of Labour and Orga-
nisation of Firms
The purpose of this chapter is to examine
the relationship between the organisational
mode of firms and technological factors. In
section 1, we will first examine several types
of organisational mode, both within and be-
tween firms. The key issue here is the mode
of coordination of the division of labour.
Then, we will focus on the types of innova-
tion and types of investment in technological
factors, to this end, section 2 examines the
relationship between the mode of coordina-
tion between firms and the types of invest-
ment, and section 3 the relationship between
the mode of coordination within firms and
the types of innovation.
The argument concludes in section 4, with
a final analysis of the organisational learn-
ing paradigm and market-hierarchies para-
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digm, typical of Japanese and U.S. firms re-
spectively.
1: Coordination Cost and Division of Labour
1.1: Types of Division of Labour
There are two types of division of labour:
1. the detailed division of labour presented by
Adam Smith, and 2. Karl Marx's social divi-
sion of labour (Piore, 1992, pp. 165-166).
Let us look first at the detailed division of
labour. Piore (1992, p. 168) explains that
each operation is separated from every other
operation and that the task definition is in-
flexible. The elements of the production proc-
ess lose their original cognitive meaning in
terms of the final product. This means that
the conception of the final product and the
execution of each task are separated. There-
fore, the detailed division of labour dictates a
strictly hierarchical organisation where the
execution of the individual tasks is subordi-
nated to a higher authority. This authority
can re-assimilate the tasks into a cognitive
frame in terms of the final market value of
the product. Smyth and Lo (2000, p. 339)
propose that the detailed division of labour
underpins the market-hierarchies para-
digms, which recognise a firm as a special
kind of market arrangement comprising a
"nexus of contracts". They conclude that all
contractual phenomena including "the firm"
can be understood in terms of utility
maximising choice. They further explain
that Williamson (1985, p. 12) adopts the hier-
archical paradigm view and recognises the
hierarchical firm as the product of economi-
sing on transaction cost. They note the con-
cept by Williamson's (1985, p. 87) that "in the
beginning there were markets", and that he
perceives the firm as a logical extension of
the market, rather than a separate learning
process. The hierarchical paradigm is there-
fore, according to Smyth and Lo, in the same
category as the market paradigm.
Concerning the social division of labour,
Piore (1992, p. 160) introduces "flexible spe-
cialisation". He defines this as a series of
small units engaged in increasing direct com-
munication within a dense social network.
Piore (1992, pp. 168-169) explains that such
networks are often appropriate not only for
relationships among small firms, but also
among the internal units of large corporate
enterprises, and between the corporation and
its suppliers, customers, and external com-
petitors.
Within this network, "flexible specialisa-
tion" gives rise to innovation. This is effected
by a tension between two cognitive frames: a
deepening of understanding within the given
cognitive frame is opposed by the pull to re-
integrate back into a different frame for
product manufacture. "Flexible specialisa-
tion" is defined (Piore and Sabel, 1984, p. 17)
as a strategy of permanent innovation of
ceaseless change. This strategy is based on
flexible multi-use equipment and skilled
workers. The social division of labour is pro-
moted by entities involved in the production,
which deepen their knowledge within given
conceptual categories, and develop their own
specialities more fully. It is the network that
enables them to deepen and integrate their
conceptual specialities. Piore (1992, p. 170)
explains that this form of growth permits
horizontal coordination between entities and
thereby eliminates a hierarchical social divi-
sion of labour. Smyth and Lo (2000, p. 339),
propose that this type of division underpins
organisational learning paradigms. The new
paradigm is characterised by the co-operative
(or reciprocal) action of individuals within
the organisation or between the organisa-
tions in a specified area (such as an indust-
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rial district). So, the learning process－and
hence, creation of knowledge－ become not
individual but collective,with individuals con-
tributing jointly and sharing information to
create and deepen the collective knowledge.
Under this paradigm, individuals also tend to
establish a long-term relationship with each
other. In this respect, J-mode－the stylised
organisational mode of Japanese firms out-
lined by Aoki (1990, p. 3) and characterized
by horizontal coordination among units,
sharing of ex-post on-site information (or
learnedresult) and long-termcommitments－
is also categorised in the organisational
learning paradigm.
However, let us consider last the feasibility
of the social division of labour being pro-
moted in the market. I would suggest that
the social division of labour can also be con-
sidered by introducing the aspect of the
organisational learning paradigm in the con-
text of a market-hierarchies paradigm. This
trend is in progress especially in the sphere
of information technology,where entities can
easily find trade partners and share informa-
tion or knowledge. Here, the relationship of
entities involved in the social division of
labour does not always have to be long-term,
and competition in the market disciplines the
player involved.
1.2: Division of Labour and Coordination
An economy can become efficient and grow
through specialisation by trading, exchang-
ing and cooperating to pursue a common
purpose. The division of labour is promoted
through the interaction or integration of
units, including people, which are involved in
different types of economic activities. These,
of course, have to be coordinated, which gen-
erates costs. On this point, Milgrom and
Roberts (1992, p. 25), suggest that people can
produce more if they cooperate, specialise in
their production activities and then transact
with one another to acquire the goods and
services they need. At the same time, their
decisions and actions need to be coordinated
to achieve the gains of cooperation, and they
also need to be motivated to carry out their
parts of the cooperative activity. So, speciali-
sation entails coordination and coordination
entails costs.
Sayer (1995, pp. 46-48) explains that coor-
dination regulates material and information
flows, controls rates of exchange, and pro-
vides signals, rules and incentives to players,
in order to deliver specific products to spe-
cific users for specific needs. The mode of co-
ordination links producers and users and
also influences the allocation of scarce re-
sources (including labour power). So, it af-
fects who can produce or consume what.
Therefore, he concludes, any mode of coordi-
nation requires an established definition of
rights and responsibilities over the property
being produced, used, and exchanged. It must
also be made clear who is allowed to do what,
with what.
Regarding coordination and division of
labour, he suggests that the division of
labour presupposes modes of coordination or
integration that link the various specialised
activities in time and space. The division of
labour may be coordinated, according to
Sayer, by various combinations of custom,
authority, coercion, negotiation and demo-
cratic process. Therefore, modes of coordina-
tion are not only the "plan" or "market", but
imply support for a certain mode of division
of labour.
The above argument implies that coordina-
tion is promoted through institutions, either
formal or informal. For instance, firms pro-
duce goods through the input of labour serv-
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ice and capital. So, the relevant economic in-
stitutions, such the employment service
which provides the labour and the bank
which provides the finances, set up a certain
mode of coordination.They thereby facilitate
the economic activities of firms, and also de-
serve our attention. To this end, such eco-
nomic institutions are analysed in next
chapter.
The coordination cost of specialised eco-
nomic activities (or the division of labour) is
examined by Borland and Yang(1992, p.
386). They look at the relationship between
the trade transaction cost and division of
labour where 1. returns increase under a gen-
eral equilibrium market and 2.there are indi-
viduals who are ex-ante identical. They
suggest that there is a trade-off between the
transaction cost and the increase in return
by specialisation (or the division of labour).
In Borland and Yang's model (1992, p. 387),
if an individual purchases z units of con-
sumption goods, this generates a transaction
cost of (1-k)*z, and the individual receives kz
from the purchase. In this condition, k can be
interpreted as the transaction efficiency coef-
ficient. They conclude that the market struc-
ture will depend on the relative size of
transaction efficiency and increased returns
due to specialisation.
Borland and Yang (1992, p. 339) further
explain that the effect of "learning-by-doing"
increases the benefits of specialisation. In
their analysis, the optimal level of specialisa-
tion (division of labour) is low if the dis-
counted value of the benefit from speciali-
sation － generated through learning-by-
doing － is outweighed by current utility
losses. However, as learning-by-doing in pro-
duction raises the benefits from specialisa-
tion relative to the costs of foregone con-
sumption, a greater degree of specialisation
will occur. In summary, this argument sug-
gests that the greater the benefit of learning-
by-doing under the division of labour is, or
the greater the transaction cost efficiency is,
the greater will be the degree of division of
labour.
Boland and Yang's argument treats the
concept of the transaction cost, in general, as
the cost generated in the market transaction.
However, this argument, they suggest, can
also be applied to analyse the evolution of the
mode of division of labour between units or
individuals within a firm, between firms, and
between countries. As such, their argument
seems to be applicable to coordination within
firms.
The relationship between coordination, co-
ordination cost, and the division of labour
can be inferred from the above arguments.
Stating the relationship explicitly, cost effi-
cient coordination combined with the bene-
fits of learning-by-doing, will entail the
development of division of labour. On the
other hand, coordination is necessary to im-
prove or maintain coordination cost effi-
ciency and the benefit of learning-by-doing
in order to gain the benefit of specialisation
(or the division of labour). On this condition,
there are several modes of coordination,as
constituted by different types of institutions.
1.3: Organisational Cost for Coordinating the
Division of Labour within Firms
Let us now examinethe contents of coordi-
nation cost and its attributes by focusing on
"organisational costs" which are coordination
costs for promoting the division of labour
within firms.
As is in market, there is the division of
labour between units and personnel pro-
moted within firm. In order to promote this,
firms allocate resources in a hierarchical
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order. However, as Williamson (1985, p. 46),
explains, due to bounded rationality, limited
spans of control are implied. For instance, as
the size of the firm increases, successive lev-
els of organisation are added, and as a result,
the effects of hierarchical control loss out-
weigh any gains.
Milgrom, P. and Roberts J. (1990, pp. 81-
83) explain "influence costs" generated
through coordination within a firm. Influ-
ence costs are caused by (1) excess interven-
tion by the authority, (2) increase in time
devoted to influencing activities, and a corre-
sponding reduction in organisational produc-
tivity, (3) poor decision-making resulting
from the distortion of information associ-
ated with influence activities, and (4) a loss
of efficiency as the organisation adapts its
structure and policies to control influence ac-
tivities and their costs (such as the cost for
filtering information).
Alchian A. and Demsetz H. (1972, pp. 779-
781) focus on the metering problem caused
by team production within a firm, and exam-
ine the determinants of firm expansion. They
define a firm as an efficient market and as a
means to increase productivity; the firm is a
device for enhancing competition among sets
of input resources as well as more efficiently
rewarding the inputs. Therefore, they state
that the existence of a firm can be explained
by an increase in productivity by the synergy
of team production. However, team produc-
tion causes a metering problem that is an at-
tribute of the coordination cost (the cost of
monitoring). The classical firm, Alchian and
Demsetz (1972, pp. 781-782) explain, emerged
as a means to reduce the loss from shirking
caused by team production. Hence, in their
framework, the existence or size of a firm de-
pends on the factors determining the moni-
toring costs within it.
These costs for the coordination of the di-
vision of labour within an organisation seem
to depend on its structure (or mode of coor-
dination for the division of labour), such as
decision-making procedures, information
processing, and the reward system.
2: The Mode of Coordination for the Division
of Labour within Firms
2.1: Information Structure and Mode of Divi-
sion of Labour within Firms
M. Aoki examines and compares the
organisational structure of the stylised U.S.
mode of firms (or "A-firm") and the stylised
Japanese firms ("J-firm").
Aoki (1986, pp. 972-973) characterises the
stylised U.S. mode by (1) a hierarchical dis-
tinction between planning and implementa-
tion, (2) separation between different pro-
cesses, an emphasis on economy of specialisa-
tion, and (3) clear boundaries of work task
between workers. He (1986, p. 971) explains
that the top-level offices, which have profes-
sional ex-ante knowledge, commit to plan
production, line management, and product
development. Then, the ex-ante plan from the
top-level offices is implemented by each op-
erational unit of the lower level of hierarchy.
Regarding the separation of different proc-
esses, Aoki (1990, pp. 6-7) states that the
feedback system is clearly distinguished
phase-by-phase, and movement to the next
phase is determined by an independent phase
review conducted by a representative from
each operational unit (such as production,
sales, and engineering). In this system, the
operational implementation of each unit is
promoted independently from the adjust-
ment between the units, each being separated
to implement its own function.
Therefore, specialised skill is the most
valuable function of the system. Aoki (1993,
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p. 252) explains that the knowledge shared
between units is documented and officially
institutionalised. Thus, in the case of a
change in engineering, the information feeds
back to the planning section, which conse-
quently officially redesigns the plan.
Aoki (1986, pp. 972-973) explains that the
stylised Japanese mode of firms is chara-
cterised by (1) horizontal coordination
among the operational units and (2) sharing
spot information based on non-official and
oral communication. This enables the shar-
ing of tacit ideas in processing operations. In
order to achieve the operation, blue-collar
workers who are responsible at shop level
need to be qualified and to understand not
only their own part of the process but the
whole, in order to deal with any emerging
problem autonomously. An ex-ante plan is
flexibly devised when information from the
work front, such as a product defect, is avail-
able to the operational unit that implements
the plan (Aoki 1990, p. 8).
Horizontal coordination, which requires
time and labour in order to communicate, ne-
gotiate, and learn to gain new information.
This entails sacrificing the economy of
specialisation to some degree(Aoki 1990, p.
8). Aoki (1990, pp. 6-7) states that the move-
ments between phases are generally flexible
and correspond to each other. For example, a
project is promoted by the team, comprising
representatives from each operational unit－
sales, manufacturing, engineering, and de-
velopment － and the problem concerning
authority is discussed by the group. The
members of this feedback group are infor-
mally, horizontally coordinated and closely
connected. Aoki (1993, p. 255) explains that
the horizontal coordination is supported by
the rotation system in which workers are ro-
tated through several different offices and
become familiar with various jobs. This con-
tributes to avoid identifying their interests
with their own job or office and to reduce the
probability of an increase in a sectoral inter-
est which does not correspond to the inter-
ests of the whole organisation.
2.2: Types of Innovation Suitable for the two
Modes and Evolution towards increased
Strength
Aoki (1993, p. 252) outlines some proposi-
tions concerning the suitability of both
modes of firm.
2.2.1: Stylised Japanese Mode of Firms
The stylised Japanese mode is efficient in
an environment where the changing process
is incremental and not rapid. In this case,
Aoki states, the information value, which is
created by horizontal coordination at the op-
erational level, outweighs the loss of effi-
ciency caused by sacrificing specialisation of
operation. Best (1990, p. 138) also states that
an entrepreneurial firm, which seems to cor-
respond to the stylised Japanese mode, is ad-
vantaged by continuous improvement in
methods, products and processes in a collec-
tive manner. Innovation is here characterized
by accretion of marginal adjustment in prod-
uct process and organisation, which is not
only generated from the insight of the spe-
cialist engineer but also from the labourer at
the work front. Thus, in production, their
pursuit of innovation in process is realised by
continuous improvement, and they seek a
competitive advantage through superior
product performance. In this sense, the
stylised Japanese mode of firms has strength
in "process innovation" (Aoki 1993, p. 252).
As for the evolved mode of stylised Japa-
nese firms, Aoki (1995, pp. 339-342) presents
the "horizontal hierarchy", in which organi-
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sational practice is set to ensure that the op-
erating units jointly observe the whole proc-
ess and exert external effects on the produc-
tivity of entire units. Then, operating units
observe respective idiosyncratic risk, which
affects the individual productivity of each
unit, in order to choose the appropriate op-
erational level. The more complementary the
operating tasks among the units, the more
time is spent on collective observation of the
whole process. This mode requires of the
units the capacity for information process-
ing, and workers are expected to possess a
wide-ranging intellectual capacity to deal
with emerging problems. With this system,
the role of the management section is con-
fined to providing the organisational frame-
work.
2.2.2: Stylised U.S. Mode of Firms
Concerning the stylised U.S. mode, Aoki
(1988, pp. 29-30) states when the planning
environment － such as market, production
line and development opportunity－is stable,
learning at the operational unit level does
not add information value to the ex-ante
plan. On the other hand, when the environ-
ment is likely to change drastically and is un-
certain, decentralised adaptation to the
environmental change would result in insta-
bility. This is because learning takes time, so
if the environment is very volatile and infor-
mation to be learned and shared varies fre-
quently, the benefit of horizontal coordi-
nation is lost (Aoki 1990, pp. 8-9). Therefore,
in these two extreme cases, the prototype
U.S. mode, characterised as an economy of
specialisation and top-down decision-
making, is superior in achieving the organi-
sational goal. Aoki concludes that this mode,
economy of specialisation, is efficient for sta-
ble mass production for a standardised
product, or is advantageous for uncertain in-
novation that includes the establishment of a
new concept for potential market (hence
product innovation), or a scientific approach
that is highly specialised. Best (1990, pp. 117-
118), also points out that the hierarchical
firm, apparently corresponding to the
stylised U.S. firm, is characterised by a tra-
ditional individualist approach. Its advan-
tage lies in dealing with radical structural
change. In other words, the stylised U.S.
mode of firm has the advantage in product
innovation by generating new concepts.
Turning to the evolution of the stylised
U.S. mode of firm, Aoki (1995, p. 342) ex-
plains that in order to realise the required in-
troduction of more complex technology, the
careful attention and intelligent discretion of
the worker on the spot are necessary to in-
crease the information processing capacity at
the lower level of the hierarchy. However,
since this mode is characterized by a lack of
capacity to make each operational unit access
the systematic risk, it cannot deal with the
endless technological innovation that re-
quires the coordination of all the units. In
order to overcome this, Aoki explains, the
U.S. mode has been evolved to a "differenti-
ated information structure." This mode is
characterised by, each unit processing and
interpreting the information in its own way
and making decisions, despite observing both
systematic and idiosyncratic risk.
2.3: Implications
So far, we have explained and compared
the difference in the coordination of the divi-
sion of labour and in the informational
structure between the stylised U.S. and Japa-
nese firms. The common focal point in these
arguments has been the difference in the
mode of coordination for the division of
Organisational Mode of Firms and Economic Institutions
中京経営研究 第23巻 第1・2号 159
labour between the operational units and the
role of each level of entities (such as worker
or unit).
In the stylised U.S. mode of firms, each op-
erational unit only focuses on idiosyncratic
risk and follows the hierarchical orders of
the manager who has prior knowledge about
systematic and idiosyncratic risk. At this
stage of evolution, the coordination mode
still has aspects of the detailed division of
labour, because each unit does not have the
concept of systematic risk (hence whole firm
information). In the new mode (differenti-
ated information structure), the organisa-
tion is designed to take systematic risk
(whole firm information) into consideration
for the decision-making of each operational
unit. However, the unit obtains the whole
firm information (or knowledge) and inter-
prets it in its own manner for decision-
making.
The interpretation of the information by
different units is not necessarily the same
(Aoki, 1997, p. 248). At this stage of evolu-
tion, each unit has a concept of the finished
product (in terms of whole firm informa-
tion) and promotes its execution. Thus, the
coordination is the social division of labour.
As Aoki explains, the stylised U.S. mode
stresses economy of specialisation through
clearly distinguishing each operation. Under
the strong power of the management unit,
the cost of organisation seems to be solved by
the hierarchical order. In this mode, the roles
of the management section and professionals
are crucial to designing the plan and the new
concept. This corresponds to the market-
hierarchies paradigm and is characterized by
the individualistic approach of each unit (or
worker) for coordinating the division of
labour. The structural change of the firm or
innovation largely depends on the manage-
rial section or professionals, and the estab-
lishment of a new concept for a potential
market is the type of innovation, i.e. product
innovation, most appropriate to this mode.
Information sharing is promoted through
documentation by the management (or plan-
ning) section, and each unit shares the infor-
mation as explicit knowledge. With these
features, according to Aoki (1995, p. 344),
the evolved organisation enables each unit to
have the whole firm's information. Thus,
each unit develops the social division of
labour. Regarding the competition of person-
nel, the allocation of human resources within
this mode of coordination is basically deter-
mined by the conditions of the external (oc-
cupational) labour market. (The details of
types of knowledge and labour market sys-
tems will be examined in the next chapter.)
However, in the stylised Japanese mode of
firms, each unit puts relatively more weight
on systematic risk, considering whole firm
information, and stresses the stochastic cor-
relation among the operational units and
their complementary relation to each other.
Each worker contributes to this mechanism,
thereby integrating conception and execu-
tion. Therefore, all the workers in firm con-
tribute to the development of social division
of labour. The management section merely
provides the organisational framework. Aoki
(1995, p. 339), states that this type of infor-
mation processing capacity is firm specific,
and is useful in the context of operation,
rather than operation through expert skill.
Therefore, individuals, including shop-floor
workers, must acquire the firm-specific skills
and not only his/her process, but also the
processes of others. In order to train and pro-
mote information sharing among workers,
Aoki (1993, pp. 251-253), points out that even
at the expense of economy of specialisation,
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workers are rotated through several opera-
tional units in order to become familiar with
various tasks, and this enables them to com-
municate unofficially and to understand tacit
ideas.
This coordination is suitable for continu-
ous and incremental improvement (or proc-
ess innovation) of products or the production
process. Rotation is also helpful in avoiding
the worker developing his/her own interest
in a certain division, so reducing the influ-
ence cost. Moreover, the skill of workers
tends to be specific to a firm. All the units or
workers communicate with each other and
deepen their knowledge within given concep-
tual categories (in Aoki's words, units or
workers observe systematic risk) and de-
velop their own specialities. In this sense,
this feature seems to belong to the social di-
vision of labour and promotes flexible
specialisation (See Piore's (1992) argument
in section 1). Therefore, the stylised Japa-
nese mode underpins organisational learning
paradigms.
3: Summary
As a summary of the whole argument pre-
sented in this chapter, there appear to be two
extremes of types of coordination for the di-
vision of labour within firms; these corre-
spond to the stylised U.S. and Japanese
modes of firm, respectively. Both can be suit-
able for adapting to their environments and
generating innovation.
3.1: Stylised U.S. mode/market-hierarchies
paradigm
The first type is the market-hierarchies
paradigm, and its division of labour is
categorised as the detailed division of labour.
The stylised U.S. mode of firms belongs to
this paradigm. The coordination of this type
of organisation features a top-down hierar-
chical order in which the lower echelons de-
velop the detailed division of labour.
Consideringthe suitability of environment,
change in the market or technology, whether
stable or radical, seems most suitable; in a
stable environment, information or knowl-
edge generated by the lower hierarchy does
not generate value so much as the ex-ante
policy implemented through the hierarchical
order. But with radical changes in the
environment,value comes not from the incre-
mental improvement resulting from deep co-
ordination between different units (or
personnel) in the lower hierarchy, and conse-
quent sacrifice of the benefits of specialisa-
tion; rather, value is generated by the new
concept of the product for the potential mar-
ket filtering down from professional speciali-
sation at top of the hierarchy. We can
therefore conclude that the strength of the
stylised U.S. mode of firm lies in product in-
novation.
3.2: Stylised Japanese mode/organisational
learning paradigm
The stylised Japanese mode of firms be-
longs to the organisational learning para-
digm characterised by the social division of
labour. The coordination for the division of
labour of this paradigm manifests horizontal
communication and a network of knowledge
created from the work front. Looking at the
division of labour within firms, coordination
features horizontal communication and coop-
eration between the lower hierarchy (or
work front) for knowledge creation. Here,
the role of the top hierarchy is to create
organisational framework as a coordinator.
Each unit or worker operates with a concep-
tion of the final product and this, therefore,
develops the social division of labour.
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Finally we come to the question of a suit-
able environment for this mode, which seems
to be that of incremental change in the mar-
ket or technology. Under an environment
characterised by incremental change, the
benefit of information or knowledge gener-
ated by the lower hierarchy through deep co-
ordination outweighs the loss of any benefits
of specialisation. The strength of the stylised
Japanese mode therefore lies in process inno-
vation.
Ⅲ . Economic Institutions (Employ-
ment and Financial Systems) and
their Influence on the Organisa-
tion of Firms
In this chapter, we look at the relationship
between the types of economic institution,
namely employment and financial systems,
and their organisational structure, i.e. the
mode of coordination for the division of
labour within firms (as discussed in chapter
2). As North (1990, pp. 4-5) states, such eco-
nomic institutions work to constrain or
regulate organisations. But conversely,
organisations also can influence the institu-
tional framework. Thus economic institu-
tions and organisations interact with each
other.
The relationship between financial systems
and employment systems is often perceived
to imply a unified economic system, since
they institutionally complement each other's
functions and support each other (Aoki,
1989, pp. 39-40). Milgrom P. and Roberts, J.
(1990, p. 1255), also suggest that the two sys-
tems strategically complement each other,
implying that the more entities adopt a cer-
tain strategy, the greater the incentive for
other entities to adopt it too.
Let us consider some issues arising from
these arguments. In section 1 we will exam-
ine the influence of the financial structure of
the firm on its management. The researcher
has taken the view of incomplete contract
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Table 1 : Paradigm, Mode of Coordination for the Division of Labour, and Suitability
Market-Hierarchical Paradigm Organisational Paradigm
Principle of the Division
of Labour Detailed Division of Labour Social Division of Labour
Mode of Institutional
Arrangement
Market or Hierarchy
Network
(though Horizontal Communication)
Organisational Mode Stylised U.S. Firm Stylised Japanese Firm
Specialisation
Stress of Specialisation /Boundary
of Job is Clearly Devined
Stress Horizontal Communication and
Cooperation /Boundary of Job is Not
Clearly Defined
Mode of Coordination
for the Division of Labour
Hierarchical Coordination
(DOL within Firm)
Horizontal Coordination
(DOL within Firm)
Plan/Knowledge
DOL with ex-ante plan /knowledge DOL with ex-post adjustment of plan
/knowledge
Stable External
Environment
Unstable (Radical Change) or Sta-
ble
Incremental Process of Change
Suitable Type of Innova-
tion (DOL within Firm)
Product Innovation by Establish-
ment of New Concept for Potential
Market
Process Innovation by Continuous
Improment at Work Front
Source: Compiled from chapter Ⅱ.
theory on this matter; the key issues are the
characteristics of financial stakeholders and
their demand for a return on their invest-
ment. Then, in section 2, we will look at the
employment system adopted by the firm. We
start here from the knowledge and skill for-
mation of labour and proceed to the employ-
ment system, bearing in mind the types of
labour market and incentive mechanisms of
labour. In section 3, the relationship between
the financial structure of the firm and the
employment system will be examined.
This will allow us finally to discuss the in-
fluence of the two systems of economic insti-
tutions on the mode of the coordination or
the organisational structure of the firm. We
will conclude that a certain type of economic
institution (in this case, the combination of
financial and employment systems) works
effectively in regulating a certain type of
organisation, or of coordination for the divi-
sion of labour.
1: Financial Systems
1.1: Financial Systems and Management of
Firms
The most relevant and fundamental theory
concerning the relationship between financial
systems and management of firms is that ex-
pressed by M. Miller and F. Modigliani
(1958, pp. 268-269): "under perfect competi-
tion without asymmetric information in the
asset market, the firms' choices between debt
and equity and their dividend decisions have
no effect on their total market value, and
therefore have no effect on firm manage-
ment".
However, Aoki (1988, pp. 102-103) sug-
gests that in reality, various taxes are im-
posed on a corporation and individuals, and
there are institutions for financial inter-
mediation between the owner of the wealth
and the corporation. Therefore, there are dif-
ferent patterns of corporate finance to deal
with different tax systems, financial systems
and restrictions on a financial institution.
Milgrom and Roberts (1992, p. 491) also
claim that the diverse tax obligation of divi-
dends, capital gains and interest payments
influences firms' decisions for financing.
These arguments suggest that the presump-
tion of the M&M theorem is not realistic.
An alternative view concerns the relation-
ship between financial systems and firm
management. Since a firm's organisation
comprises several stakeholders, such as man-
ager, employee and lender, each pursuing
their own self-interest, the method of raising
funds affects the decision of production and
investment of the firm by stipulating rights
of control and rewards for each of its mem-
bers. Gintis (1990, p. 291) calls this system
"external accountability", and explains that
while the organisational structure of the
firm is dictated by considerations of effi-
ciency, the central relevance of external ac-
countability prefers the firm structure that
is influenced by political accountability. The
factor of external accountability implies that
a firm's choice of management, while reflect-
ing its external accountability to financial
stakeholders, may not always realise supe-
rior efficiency.
As Milgrom and Roberts (1992, p. 491)
suggest, it is worth examining how capital
structure can affect value; 1. by affecting the
conflicts of interest that can arise between
stockholders and creditors to alter the incen-
tives of managers, 2. by influencing the prob-
ability that the costs of bankruptcy will be
incurred, and 3. by providing incentives for
equity investors and lenders to monitor man-
agement.
The basic idea for examining the influence
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of stakeholders on firm management is, as
Williamson (1988, pp. 572-575) suggests, that
the model of governance involves an ex-ante
stage in which market prices and contracts
are formed, and an ex-post stage in which ac-
tual decisions are made. The ex-post stage is
supposedly the area of the incomplete con-
tract.
The basic premise of this theory is that in
the production process of a firm, an effective
contract can only cover part of the domain.
Therefore, in the ex-post stage, corporate fi-
nance can affect how the control rights to de-
cision-making are allocated in corporate
management. Hirota and Ikeo (1996, p. 55)
explain first, that the important issue is who
owns the residual rights of control － the
right to final decision-making on corporate
management, which ex-ante contracts cannot
define. Secondly, this allocation of rights
among investors depends on how and from
whom the corporation raises the funds. This
is because the financier is generally given the
right to claim the benefit, such as dividends
and interest, and the right to participate in
corporate management. Lastly, they suggest
that other stakeholders, such as sharehold-
ers, may now take the inefficient action nor-
mally restricted to managers.
According to the above theory of corporate
finance, the key issues are the characteristics
of stakeholders (for example, whether they
have a long-term or short-term view of their
profit), and change in their composition, in-
cluding a degree of concentration and the ho-
mogeneity of the holdings of stakeholders
who own financial instruments (Berglof,
1990, p. 237).
1.2: The Characteristics of Financial Stake-
holders and their Influence on Firm Man-
agement
Let us take the incentive of managers.
Jensen (1989, p. 73) says that managers
often take inefficient measures to maximise
firm value and, consequently, share value.
Rather, they prefer to pursue physical ex-
pansion of the firm and to spend on their fa-
cility, which is often not the best way for the
firm to maximise profits. Milgrom and
Roberts (1992, p. 492) state that managers
are more interested than shareholders in the
growth and longevity of the firm organisa-
tion, as it provides them with more opportu-
nities for promotion. Management also tends
to spend so much on perks for its members
and possibly for their subordinates, because
they can enjoy these while bearing only part
of the cost of the perk. Moreover, Milgrom
and Roberts suggest that managers prefer
independence from outside interference, as
this contributes to job security and allows
them to set higher rates of pay for their own
ranks.
However, some factors do help discipline
managers to maximise share value. Firstly,
even if management compensation were for-
mally unrelated to share price, the effect of
reputation motivates managers to maximise
share value. Fama (1980, p. 292) argues that
managers would seek to maximise sharehold-
ers' wealth in order to protect or enhance
their reputations in the managerial labour
market. Gibbons and Murphy (1992, p. 491)
also suggest that there is a reputation effect
which aligns the interests of managers and
shareholders; however, they go on to state
that the effect is not overwhelmingly strong,
particularly for managers nearing the end of
their careers. Garvey and Swan (1996, pp. 95-
96) introduce the argument by Kato and
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Rockel (1992) that managers' incentives in
Japan, and conclude that career concerns are
likely to be far weaker in Japan, where most
CEOs are promoted from within the firm and
the overall turnover is much lower. These ar-
guments imply that the longer the managers'
career and the more they are recruited exter-
nally, the greater the incentive becomes to
care about the reputation effect and increas-
ing share value.
Regarding the influence of shareholders,
the corporation is typically run mainly in the
stakeholders' interest,which is to maximise
stock value. Moreover, shareholders have as
a general rule the right to elect a new group
of directors or even, in some cases, to recom-
mend that managers take explicit actions.
Pound (1992, p. 7) points out that many
large institutional shareholders, such as in
public pension funds, have attempted to in-
fluence corporate decisions, and at times suc-
ceeded in the 1990s. Richard J. Zeckhauser
and John Pound (1990, p. 149, 177) highlight
the positive influence of the efficacy of large
shareholders as monitors.
Milgrom and Roberts (1992, p. 497) state
that major shareholders who have large
sums at stake can play an important role in
disciplining management, because they are
willing to incur the expense of filing lawsuits
to protect their interests, and they are able
to fire managers who are performing badly.
In the case of Japan, they explain, other com-
panies that hold another corporation's stock
can also serve as monitors because of a very
direct and pressing interest in the success of
each other's firm. The necessarily close rela-
tionship among them may result in them
playing an active role in monitoring.
Milgrom and Roberts (1992, p. 497) cite the
example of executives from a major firm be-
coming CEOs of a smaller, related firm in
order to affect the firm's decisions (known as
"Horizontal Keiretsu" in Japan.)
However, Roe (1990, p. 16), explains that
there is a problem not only with sharehold-
ers' knowledge but also with their ability to
collaborate with other shareholders in order
to affect the management for their own in-
terests. Romano (1991, p. 55) states that
class action suits brought by shareholders
are not rewarding for the participants, thus
implying that the cost of suing the manage-
ment may be too expensive for shareholders
as a means of influence.
The above arguments present two oppos-
ing views regarding the influence of share-
holders on the corporate management. The
first is to suggest the existence of the
stakeholders' influence on the management.
On the other hand, there are also arguments
that limit influence to shareholders within
the management One possible hypothesis to
help combine these two opposite views is pro-
vided by Milgrom and Roberts (1992, p. 499).
They suggest that the outsiders (sharehold-
ers) would be more effective monitors in
firms with relatively little "firm - and man-
ager-specific capital" than those where capi-
tal is very largely "firm - and manager-
specific", because in the latter case it will be
harder both to analyse investment decisions
and to change them to improve efficiency if
performance seems lacking.
Another motivation for managers to
maximise share value is the threat of take-
over. Manne (1965, pp. 114-115) suggests
that competition for the votes generally at-
tached to equity shares (or the market for
corporate control) is the most important
force that drives managers to maximise
shareholder wealth. Supporting this view,
Morck, Shleifer and Vishney (1988, p. 101)
make it clear that gross managerial slack can
Organisational Mode of Firms and Economic Institutions
中京経営研究 第23巻 第1・2号 165
be pruned by hostile takeovers, or at least the
threat of them.
Conversely, there are some arguments
which only recognise the distinct limitations
of the influence of takeover on managers' de-
cision-making. Kester (1991, p. 239) states
that hostile takeovers are rare in Japan and
Germany. Moreover, Jensen (1991, pp. 15-16)
explains that even in the U.S., regular devel-
opments and the chilling of the junk bond
market have substantially dampened the
takeover market. One reason for the diffi-
culty of takeovers may be that substantial
cost barriers to hostile takeovers serve to in-
sulate or even to entrench incumbent manag-
ers. Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988, p. 13)
concluded that the price paid for shares in a
successful takeover bid was on average 20-30
percent higher than the pre-bid price, and
that the shareholders of some successful bid-
der firms actually lost money because of the
takeover.
Dickerson, Andrew P., Heather D. Gibson,
and Euclid Tsakalotos (1998, p. 298), con-
clude, from the results of a study of a large
panel of U.K. quoted companies, that higher
dividend payments are associated with a sig-
nificantly lower conditional probability of
takeover. Sheard (1994, pp. 318-319), points
out that, as in Japan, the prevalence of inter-
locking shareholding, which prioritises
defence against takeover, not maximisation
of share value, effectively prevents hostile
takeovers and alleviates the exit (or sell-off)
of shareholders. Hence, the average share-
holder would seem to have little influence.
As far as bond holdings are concerned,
Gerald T. Garvey and Peter L. Swan (1996, p.
98) explain that, in early models, sharehold-
ers with limited liability receive all the resid-
ual gains of a firm's decisions when share
prices increase, while bondholders bear some
of the losses associated with poor perform-
ance (in extreme cases, bankruptcy). How-
ever, Coffee (1986, p. 69) retorts that mana-
gerial incentives are naturally aligned with
the bondholders' interest in the absence of ex-
plicit incentive schemes to make managers
make decisions against their interests. Sup-
porting this, Aghion, Hart and Moore (1992,
p. 542) conclude that a key objective of man-
agement for solvent firms must be to avoid
financial distress, and to ensure that credi-
tors are paid. These arguments suggest that
managers tend to respect the interests of
bondholders as far as possible.
In the case of Japan, Aoki (1988, p. 127)
states that leading creditors are often sub-
stantial shareholders; however, they are
more active in defence of their bond holdings
than of their shareholdings. Also, as Abe
(1999, p. 80) indicates, the term of redemp-
tion for company bonds is relatively short,
and generally, when the firm defaults, the
priority for collecting the principal is lower
than that of bank credit or employees' credit.
Therefore, the creditor of direct finance, such
as company bonds, would have a strong in-
centive to ensure that the managers do not
default but also that they try to satisfy the
standard to issue company bonds. Hence,
both would be conscious of the principal-
agent relationship. These arguments imply
that if the proportion of company bonds in
corporate finance increases, the pressure to
maximise a firm's profit, which is a relatively
short-term view, would increase.
The bank lastly has a strong influence as a
stakeholder of corporate finance. Generally,
a bank loan is long-term, and as with the
"main bank system" in Japan, the bank es-
tablishes a long-term relationship with a cer-
tain firm. Aoki (1988, p. 142) suggests that
while the individual shareholder may effec-
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tively be locked out in Japan and in Ger-
many, workers, debt holders and institu-
tional shareholders (main banks) together
exercise considerable influence.
On the subject of the influence of the main
bank, Stiglitz (1985, p. 148) says that as a
stakeholder, it has the role of monitoring－
and providing a substitute for－the external
capital market and the market for corporate
control. It can become a monitor by gaining
access to those informational and decision-
making mechanisms of the firm that are gen-
erally unavailable or difficult to obtain for
participants in the external capital market
(Sheard, 1989, p. 403). This role is a product
of long-term relationships, and corresponds
to the interests of the bank, which provides a
long-term loan. This relates to Milgrom and
Roberts' (1992, p. 499) argument on firm－or
manager-specific capital as outlined above. A
firm primarily dominated by firm－ and
manager-specific capital is, by inference,
more suitable for a bank loan in terms of
monitoring capacity, as the bank can gain
firm-specific information through a long-
term relationship with this type of firm.
Moreover, as Aghion and Bolton (1992, p.
486) point out, debt makes firms in crisis
reorganise, by transferring operational con-
trol rights from the manager to the creditor.
These issues also affect the main bank in its
role as a financial stakeholder. Nakatani
(1996, pp. 176-177) presents a framework to
explain nature and consistency of the incen-
tive system of firm organisations under the
main bank system. He states that in order to
motivate the entity to take appropriate ac-
tion, one must establish an incentive system
composed of "reward", "rule", and "referee."
Since each entity is motivated to behave ap-
propriately if the incentive system works,
the agency problem, which is caused by
information asymmetry, would be solved;
this would minimise agency cost.
The firm's "reward" is tripartite; first, it
gets to keep access to a stable financial re-
source, as long as it maintains a certain per-
formance. Secondly, it can dispose of the
surplus profit in any way, again providing it
maintains a high performance. Thirdly, the
firm can get financial and management relief
from the main bank when it faces managerial
difficulty, as long as it is able to continue a
good relationship with the bank, by disclos-
ing internal information to the bank and
keeping in consultation with the bank for its
operation.
Moreover, as Teranishi (1993, pp. 64-65)
explains, the external creditor of a firm that
has a relationship with the main bank
recognises that the firm is monitored and
has its management checked by the bank.
Thus, the external creditor (except the main
bank) is confident in financing the firm and
keeping the interest rate low, even if the firm
has an incentive to invest in high risk pro-
jects. The ensuing low interest rate allows
the firm to benefit from a lower agency cost.
This helps it to conduct stable investment ac-
tivities, or even to accelerate investment-
oriented growth, as can be observed in the
rapid growth era in Japan (Hoshi T.,
Kashyap A., and Scharfstein D., 1991, pp. 38-
40).
The firm's "rule" is to maintain a certain
level of performance and to disclose its inter-
nal information to the bank. It goes without
saying that the "referee" is the main bank.
These arguments suggest that the above
mechanism realises the supply of long-term
and stable financial resources to firms by the
main bank, and makes the bank act as an ex-
ternal monitor for the firm's performance
with a long-term view. As a result, the firm
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pays less attention to the short-term profit
maximisation sought by market sharehold-
ers, who seek financial gain from the invest-
ment.
1.3: Categorisation of Financial Systems
So, the management of a firm is appar-
ently influenced and changed by the composi-
tion of capital structure. On this assumption,
Berglof (1990, p. 237) categorises the finan-
cial systems into the "bank-oriented financial
system" and the "market-oriented financial
system".
Berglof (1990, p. 251) first defines the
bank-oriented financial system as consisting
of: (1) higher debt/equity ratio, (2) more
concentrated and homogenous debt owner-
ship, (3) less dispersed shareholdings, (4)
large shareholdings of commercial banks in
individual firms, (5) more stable debt and eq-
uity ownership over time, and (6) less com-
mon hostile takeover. He suggests that in
this system, the bank as creditor controls a
wider set of circumstances, and can actively
use financial distress to reorganise problem
firms. The contractual relations are charac-
terized by a higher degree of repetition, mak-
ing successful informal procedures more
likely.
Aybar and Lapavitsas (2001, p. 31) explain
that the financial system in Japan belongs to
the category of the bank-oriented financial
system, because banks provide long-term fi-
nance to the firm, monitor it intensively, in-
tervene when it is in distress, and maintain a
long-term relationship with the firm. Inter-
locking shareholdings among firms also con-
tribute to a stable ownership structure, and
protect the firm from takeovers. Berglof
(1990, p. 252) suggests that, with this sys-
tem, banks as creditors are carrying larger
shares of firm-specific risk, because, as
Milgrom and Roberts (1992, p. 499) point
out, monitoring by outside shareholders on
firm- or management- specific capital is inef-
fective.
On the other hand, in market-oriented fi-
nancial systems, reorganisation is conducted
through external solutions, making take-
overs more likely. The creditor structure, un-
like in bank-oriented financial systems, is
diffused, and creditor involvement in individ-
ual firms is restricted. This makes informal
procedures difficult to administer; so, in the
reorganisation process, the creditor often
has to depend on the court-administrated
bankruptcy solution. These features of the
system render the ownership structure and
the creditor-customer relationship more
flexible. They change over time, as share-
holders buy or sell the firm's stock. Aybar
and Lapavitsas (2001, p. 31) also explain that
creditors (banks) and firms establish an
arm's length relationship, and terms are
largely determined by prices and conditions
specified on a market contract. This system
is observed in Anglo-Saxon banking prac-
tices. In the case where the firm is in decline,
investors tend to leave rather than trying to
call for improvement. In order to satisfy in-
vestors' demands for short-term financial
benefit, the management of the firm, such as
human resources, also tends to adopt a
short-term view. Under this system, new
combinations of relationships emerge more
frequently, and Berglof (1990, p. 255) indi-
cates that this might be preferable to innova-
tion. However, he also points out that
management short-sightedness is more pre-
valent under a market-oriented financial sys-
tem.
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1.4: Types of Financial System and their Influ-
ence on Firm Management through the
Employment System
The key issues of the above arguments are:
(1) the long-term stability and flexibility of
the relationship between financier and firm,
and (2) the degree of formality in proce-
dures; informal procedures of problem-
solving lend themselves to an internal solu-
tion, formal to an external.
The determining factor of effectiveness of
these kinds of financial institution seems to
be the specificity of capital to the firm or
management. If the state of capital can be
measured in a relatively easy way by outsid-
ers, through the collection of objective data,
then a market-oriented financial system can
be effective. However, if firm and manage-
ment specificity make the state of capital dif-
ficult for outsiders to observe, a bank-
oriented financial system may be more
effective; it establishes a stable and long-
term relationship with the customer, and the
bank can access information that is not avail-
able to outsiders.
The relation of specificity of capital to
types of financial system also applies to the
employment system. The bank-oriented fi-
nancial system, which allows a long-term re-
lationship between the creditor and the firm
and a stable financial condition, is also suit-
able for nurturing firm-specific human re-
sources within the firm. This is because,
long-term training is required for accumu-
lating firm-specific human resources, which
needs the stable financial environment pro-
vided by the bank-oriented financial system.
As we will see in the next section, the sup-
port of a stable financial environment, allow-
ing retention of personnel when the firm
faces cyclical recession, creates firm-specific
human resources aided by long-term on-the-
job training. These are supported by a long-
term employment relationship, seniority
wage, and an internal promotion system.
The opposite is true of the market-oriented
financial system, under which the employ-
ment system is also influenced by market
fluctuation.
2: Skill and Knowledge of Workers, Types of
Labour, Employment System, and Firm
Organisation
2.1: Skill and Knowledge of Workers, and
Types of Labour
The main issue of the relationship between
organisational structure and mode of em-
ployment, is how workers become skilled and
are then allocated by the firm according to
their skills. This relates to the issues of man-
agement or the structure of firm organisa-
tions, such as co-operative production pro-
cesses, sharing of information between
workers, and rotation of workers within the
firm, which prevailed in the stylised Japa-
nese firm according to Aoki's arguments.
This management or structure of firm
organisation is supported by institutions
within or surrounding the firm, and also by
various institutional settings in employ-
ment, such as hiring and dismissals, person-
nel management, promotion policy, and
wage determination. These factors signifi-
cantly influence the mode of management or
the structure of firm organisations through
the raising of employees' work incentives
(Ohashi, I., and Tachibanaki, T., 1998, p. 14).
Institutional settings vary apparently inten-
tionally to take full advantage of different
types of workers with diverse knowledge and
skills as human resources.
Taking this view as our starting point, we
will examine the types of knowledge and
skills of workers, and the relation between
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these and the institutional arrangement in
employment.
2.1.1: Knowledge and Skill of Workers
Koike (1999, pp. 12-15) outlines the types
of skills of human resources in Japanese
labour. In his argument, he categorises two
types of line operations in factories. One is
termed "usual operations", which are simple,
repeated and do not require any sophisti-
cated skills. The other is "unusual opera-
tions", which are filled with uncertainty and
unpredictable incidents, therefore requiring
the workers to be skilled to cope with them.
The unusual operations are further catego-
rised into "problem solving" and "adaptation
to change".
Koike (1999, p. 12), defines the skill of
"problem solving" as detecting the cause of
the problem, solving it, and inspecting the
quality of the product. Workers acquire
skills by learning about the mechanism of
equipment and the whole system of produc-
tion. Koike (1999, p. 13) defines "adaptation
to change" as the skill to change the quantity
of production to deal with the fluctuation of
demand, to change the product to be manu-
factured, to adopt to or to propose new
manufacturing methods, and to adapt to the
change in the composition of personnel. In
order to obtain this skill, workers need to
know which tools should be used and how
they prepare them for change. They foster
their skills through long experience in their
work place. Lastly, Koike (1999, pp. 21-22)
explains that the skills of white-collar work-
ers can also be understood in the same con-
text as the skill formation of production line
workers, which enable workers to cope with
multifarious problems.
Inoki (1993, p. 108) categorises the knowl-
edge necessary to form the skills into two
types: "general knowledge" and "specific
knowledge". The first, "general" knowledge,
is noted for its standardised and lawful char-
acteristics and can be expressed quantita-
tively or abstractly. Nonaka and Takeuchi
(1995, p. 8) also point out that the knowledge
(which they call "explicit knowledge") can be
expressed in words, easily communicated and
shared in the form of hard data, scientific
formulae, codified procedures, or universal
principles. It can thus be easily processed by
a computer, transmitted electronically, or
stored in a database.
"Specific" knowledge cannot be coded and
systematised. Hence, it is "specific" to a cer-
tain place or to the moment. Nonaka and
Takeuchi (1995, p. 8) define the knowledge as
"tacit ideas" and equate it with subjective in-
sights and intuition, both highly personal
and difficult to formalise. It is thus difficult
to transmit or process in a systematic or
logical way. This also makes tacit knowledge
difficult for a third party to grasp, and im-
possible for a centrally operating unit to ad-
minister. Inoki (1993, p. 111) explains that
the only way to transmit it is "by example"
and face-to-face communications between
workers through on-the-job training, usu-
ally from senior workers to junior workers.
2.1.2: Knowledge-Sharing and Creation: Co-
mparison
The above arguments show that there are
two types of knowledge sharing and creation
among personnel within, and sometimes be-
tween, firm organisations. As explained
above, personnel can share explicit knowl-
edge through documentation, data and for-
mulae. This type of knowledge-sharing, ac-
cording to Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995, pp. 9-
11), is prevalent in firm organisations in
Europe and in the U.S. They go on to explain
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the method of knowledge-sharing and crea-
tion prevalent in Japanese firm organisa-
tions, which consists of sharing individuals'
tacit knowledge among personnel as organi-
sational knowledge, then creating the new
organisational knowledge via interaction
among the personnel.
According to Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995,
p. 122), the steps for creating and sharing
the knowledge are:
(1) Setting the theme by expressing what
is usually inexpressible by using figura-
tive language and symbolism, and mak-
ing personnel from different backgrounds
understand the subject intuitively. Figu-
rative language often takes the form of
metaphors and analogies, and is effective
for disseminating knowledge, especially
in the early stages of knowledge creation.
(2) Disseminating the personal knowledge
of individuals, and sharing or creating a
new point of view with others as organi-
sational knowledge. This is realised
through the initiative of the individual
and the interaction within the group,
such as dialogue, discussion, experience
sharing, and observation. Nonaka and
Takeuchi also point out that redundancy,
which is the overlapping process between
different functional divisions (or person-
nel) working together in a shared division
or labour, helps to create common cogni-
tive ground by transferring tacit knowl-
edge, and is important because it creates a
place for dialogue and communication.
These arguments suggest that while firms
in Europe and the U.S. consider knowledge
explicit and standardised, Japanese firms
consider it specific to themselves. Therefore,
Japanese firms must acquire knowledge by
dense communication and the direct experi-
ence of learning by doing, and connect it
between units (such as personnel or different
divisions). Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995, p.
11) explain that the Japanese approach
therefore defies the basic premise of the
"modular" or "virtual" corporation, which
uses the knowledge gained from outside
partners in place of its own. (Thus the ap-
proach of firms in Europe and the U.S.
matches the premise of the "modular" or "vir-
tual" corporation.)
2.1.3: Knowledge, Skill, and Labour Type
Regarding types of worker, Osterman, P.
(1982, pp. 350-351), states that there are
three different employment systems: (1) the
"industrial sub-system", where workers are
internally promoted to higher positions
within the firm organisation; (2) the "craft
sub-system", where workers are character-
ized by their highly sophisticated skills and
their great loyalty to his/her skill or
speciality, but also by their lack of loyalty to
the firm, and consequently common incentive
to move to another firm to seek better condi-
tions; and (3) the "secondary sub-system",
where workers are characterized as being low
skilled, and their mobilisation through the
firm is high.
We can further develop the debate in light
of the types of worker posited above. Com-
paring it first with Koike's argument as pre-
sented in 2.1.1 above, specific knowledge (or
Inoki's "tacit ideas" presented above) is that
needed to acquire skills needed for unusual
operations, and for coping with unexpected
problems and changes. Inoki explains that
when promoting automation, tacit ideas
allow one to arrange production procedures
to the extent that machines can process sim-
ple operations, and that the more one pro-
motes automation, the more difficult the
task will be. He calls this "arranging opera-
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tions" and suggests that workers are
brought up to acquire the skill through on-
the-job training (OJT) at the work place, re-
quiring the worker to have preferably long-
term experience in the firm organisation.
The other way, as examined in the previous
section, is to share individuals' tacit knowl-
edge through dense communication between
workers for the promotion of certain pro-
jects.
The common feature of both practices is to
share tacit knowledge, which is often specific
to the place and requires dense, face-to-face
communications for promoting operations,
although one may posit that explicit knowl-
edge is also shared during communication.
Therefore, the labour service of the first type
of workers tends to be human resources with
specific skills and specific knowledge of the
firm. According to Osterman (1982, p. 350),
this sort of labour applies to the industrial
sub-system.
Osterman's second type of worker is of
those who share explicit knowledge with oth-
ers to promote operations. This type of
knowledge-sharing does not require dense
face-to-face communication, but is realised
by documentation, data, and formulate
containing openly available, standardised
knowledge; but one might imply that not
only the knowledge, but the skill of this type
of worker is also standardised. Since the op-
eration is promoted with explicit knowledge,
the labour service of this type of worker
tends not to be specific to the place or firm
organisation. This also implies that this type
of worker acquires skills in formal educa-
tional institutions, such as universities and
vocational centres or through "off-the-job"
training. This type of worker may, in
Osterman's terms, be categorised into the
"craft sub-system."
The final type is the low-skilled worker
who is involved only in routine or simple op-
erations. The operations do not require so-
phisticated knowledge or skills. This type of
worker falls into the category of the "secon-
dary sub-system."
2.2: Types of Labour Market and Employment
Institutions: Conceptual Framework
Each type of employment system seems
suitable for attracting and motivating a cer-
tain type of worker, and for raising effi-
ciency and productivity. One useful concept
that categorises the employment system is
the distinction between internal labour mar-
kets (ILM) and occupational labour markets
(OLM). Ariga, Brunello, Madono and Ohbi
(1996, pp. 85-90), compare and explain the
difference in the characteristics between ILM
and OLM of skill formation, promotion, em-
ployment, reward and hierarchy.
Mainly focusing on the internal labour
market in Japan, Ariga, Brunello, and
Ohkusa (2000, pp. 1-9), also argue for two
types of labour market. Following the defini-
tion of OLM and ILM in these two works, we
will develop the argument about types of sys-
tem of labour market and employment insti-
tutions. The keys to the division between
OLM and ILM are the degree of proximity of
skill, the relationship between promotion and
consequent mode of competition, skill forma-
tion, and the organisational structure of the
hierarchical firm.
2.2.1: Key Features of OLM and Employ-
ment System
According to the studies named above, the
human resource that labour formed by OLM
accumulates completely specialises in a cer-
tain task. The skill proximity between tasks
is weak. Since the skill is often obtained
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outside the firm and is standardised, inter-
firm mobility of workers tends to be high.
The definition and evaluation of professional
ability which defines a certain job are con-
ducted outside the firm that employs the
worker, who hunts jobs and accepts offers
based on job type (Ariga K., Burunello G.,
Madono S., and Ohbi Y., (1996, p. 89)). It is
uncommon to form skills in an OLM through
on-job training within a firm. The relation
between skill formation and hierarchical
steps within a firm is therefore weak. As
Becker (1964, p. 12), explains, because skills
are transferable between firms, trainees have
to bear the full cost of such training.
In an OLM employment system, firstly,
the hierarchical demarcation of employee
promotion within a firm is very clear. In
such a case, promotion is realised by replac-
ing one occupational ability with another
which befits a higher-ranking job. The prem-
ise for the promotion is therefore to acquire
qualifications necessary for an upper post,
reducing the influence on the workers' pro-
motion prospects of assessment of perform-
ance in their current post. The disparity of
earnings between upper and lower ranks is
large. Then, as far as recruitment is con-
cerned, an applicant unsuitable for a higher
post would be employed as a worker to oper-
ate in a lower hierarchical post. Throughout
the hierarchy, personnel with specialised
skills are employed for a specific vacancy.
Each job for a workeris clearly designated;
skills are standardised and generally ac-
quired outside of the firm at the individual
worker's expense. Therefore, the
organisation relies exclusively on externally
hiring personnel with previous experience
elsewhere and their own speciality. The re-
ward is taken as a percentage of pay for the
performance of the worker. This is denoted
by:
W(t)＝MP(t)
(where W is wage, MP is marginal prod-
uct, and t is a certain point in time or a
short period.)
This is because the performance of individ-
ual workers is relatively easy to evaluate. It
is supported by Brown's (1990, p. 180) find-
ings that piece rates paid to workers are
more common among jobs with a narrow set
of routines than for those involving a variety
of duties. Under this system, workers com-
pete with anonymous outsiders, or workers
of the occupational labour market outside
the firm. Ariga, Brunello, and Ohkusa (2000,
p. 4), state that firms with this type of em-
ployment system are commonly found in the
U.K. and in the U.S.
In the employment system of a stylised
U.S. firm (A-firm) introduced by Aoki
(1988, p. 62), the inter-firm mobility of wor-
kers seeking better job opportunities is high,
jobs are clearly divided and each worker
specialises in a certain job so that worker and
job exist in a one-to-one relationship. The re-
wards for workers are determined by a cer-
tain job allocated to the worker, and the
standardised labour market is developed in-
side or outside the firm. These facts of the
employment system of the stylised U.S. firm
are similar to the features of the OLM sys-
tem.
2.2.2: Key Features of ILM and the Employ-
ment System
The internal labour market (ILM) system
adopts different policies for skill formation,
promotion, recruitment, and reward.
The skills acquired by the workers are
typified by the onus on the individual worker
to obtain a mix of skills that deals with both
his or her present job and jobs which may re-
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sult from future internal promotion. The
proximity of skill is relatively strong and is
contextually acquired from within the firm.
The mix of skills varies from firm to firm,
and therefore the skills and human resources
tend to be firm-specific (Koike, 1999, p. 166).
Thus, the external labour market tends to
place less value on human resources than
does the internal, resulting in reduced mobil-
ity of human resources between firms. This
results in allocation of internal labour to fill
vacancies.
The relationship between the promotion
system and internal skill formation is de-
fined by the strong link between the incen-
tive for skill formation under the long-term
employment relationship, and the internal
promotion system. The firm provides oppor-
tunity, place, time and means of job training,
making it possible for workers to acquire
firm-specific skills with on-location training
which secures their position in return for in-
vesting in the skill. Employees are recruited
on the premise that they can potentially be
promoted to higher posts. Therefore, the re-
quirement for employment is high, and ap-
plicants who do not seem incapable of being
promoted will not be employed. The conse-
quent hierarchical continuity ensures that
income distribution is relatively equal com-
pared with that of firms with OLM. Lastly,
labour distribution and its service price are
not determined by a wage system or by the
supply-demand conditions of the labour serv-
ice in the OLM but by the internal wage sys-
tem of the firm. Seniority in the hierarchyis
more influential on wage levels in the ILM
than in the OLM. Wages are generally re-
vised almost every year, and the revision de-
pends either on assessment by a superior or
on tests to measure the employee's ability.
A typical ILM system seems to be the
"rank hierarchy" which Aoki (1988, p. 72)
proposes. This is the employment system em-
bedded in stylised Japanese firms, char-
acterised by a horizontal information struc-
ture between workers, adaptability to new
types of operation, communication with
members of other units, and leadership or as-
sistance to subordinates. Both white- and
blue-collar workers must acquire contextual
skills developed through long-term job expe-
rience which should cover a wide range of op-
erations. This implies high skill proximity,
and the job parameters of each worker are
not clearly defined.
Aoki examines how the rank hierarchy
system encourages promotion of cooperation
among workers while they compete to ac-
quire skills, and how the system motivates
and locks those workers who are productive,
excellent at adapting or learning, diligent,
and cooperative, into the firm. He presents
three crucial factors that make up the incen-
tive system:
1) A wage system that is based on a combi-
nation of seniority and assessment by su-
periors in places of work which employ
workers in rotation.
2) An internal promotion system based on
assessment － if the achievement of the
worker satisfies certain criteria, he/she
will be promoted to the next rank. On the
other hand, a worker who cannot fulfil
the necessary criteria may be forced to re-
sign. This system makes workers form
their skills contextually.
3) A retirement payment system. Since the
amount is determined by length of serv-
ice, this system functions as a reward for
long-term service and simultaneously
makes workers long-term hostages to the
firm.
The personnel department centrally ad-
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ministrates these three elements of personnel
management. The tripartite system also
solves problems with the incentives of both
employer and employees.
In the latter case, consider the problem of
retaining capable workers for the long term
and motivating them to be diligent. First, on
changing their job, workers may be seen as
incapable and possibly incompetent in their
previous employment, or to have failed their
old company. See as such, they will be forced
to take a lower position and financial reward
in their new work place. In addition, their re-
tirement payment will reduced when they
change jobs. As Yashiro (1997, pp. 47-49) ex-
plains, since (1) workers' basic salary and
(2) their length of continuous service within
the same firm determine the amount of pen-
sion money they will accrue, the system locks
workers into the same firm. These two fac-
tors operate to retain workers within the
same firm organisation. Aoki also takes the
view that seniority on wages has the aspect
of a performance bond that stimulates work-
ers to be diligent. With this view, when the
worker is young, part of their salary is de-
ducted as a guarantee for diligence, and is re-
turned later. This is a disincentive against
changing firms.
The system thereby takes workers hos-
tage. Older workers' salaries, including the
guarantee money which is returned, are
therefore beyond their marginal production.
The wage system in this case is denoted by:
∫MP＝W(t)*T
(where W(t) is the wage at time point (t),
MP(t) is the marginal product at time (t),
and T is the period from when the worker
starts working to when he/she retires.)
On the other hand, under the system of
rank hierarchy (or the tournament system
for promotion), workers enter a firm at the
lowest rank. At this stage, the firm does not
have any knowledge about the ability of
workers, this only becoming clear after they
have accumulated skills and performed their
jobs; thus arises the problem of adverse selec-
tion. However, workers who do not demon-
strate their ability will never gain the higher
salary affiliated with more senior ranks, or
can even be dismissed. As time passes after
workers enter the firm, the disparity of rank
and reward among workers of the same age
expands according to their performance.
As far as evaluation of workers' ability is
concerned, the rank hierarchy system is a
sort of tournament in which workers who
joined in the same year compete with each
other and are evaluated on relative perform-
ance: an effective system, especially where
job proximity among workers is high and it
is difficult to measure the productivity of in-
dividuals. Another feature of promotion in
this system is "late selection," whereby the
selection of workers is conducted at a rela-
tively late stage. This, among other things,
is intended to control the signal for promo-
tion and to keep workers' expectation of pro-
motion high, thus maintaining competition
(Itoh, 1994, p. 255).
Lastly, on firms' side, for consistent moti-
vation of workers they have to guarantee
long-term employment and seniority. Since
they would lose their reputation as a credible
employer if they dismissed older staff, the
implicit contract which guarantees a higher
wage for older workers would be broken. In
this situation the firm would face difficulties
in both motivating workers and obtaining
capable young workers willing to invest in
firm-specific skills.
In these ways, the system solves the "moral
hazard" and "adverse selection" problems. It
also ensures retention of skills formed by
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workers in the firm and makes them con-
tinue their effortsto display their ability.
Ⅳ: Conclusion－Financial System,
Employment System, and Struc-
ture of Firms
1: Bank Oriented Financial System, ILM,
and Stylised Japanese Firms
We can infer from the arguments concern-
ing the knowledge and skills acquired by
workers that the ILM system is suitable for
gaining specific knowledge, sharing tacit
ideas between workers, and developing the
skills of shop level workers for dealing with
unusual operations. As discussed above,
workers can obtain the skills for coping with
such operations by understanding the equip-
ment and the system of production. The
workers must also be able to handle several
different tasks in order to cope with prob-
lems or changes. In other words, the workers
need to acquire a mix of skills and these, as a
human resource, tend to be firm specific,
realised through inter-staff communication
and length of experience in the work place.
The knowledge needed to acquire or to de-
velop these skills is called tacit ideas (or spe-
cific knowledge). This is not transmitted by
standardised manuals or clearly documented
text, but by junior workers imitating the ex-
ample of senior workers. This ensures the
transmission of firm-specific knowledge
through face-to-face communication. Both
the knowledge and the skills are formed
through long-term job experience, and the
process of acquiring them is continuous. Fi-
nally, since operations are promoted through
communications and deepening of knowledge
between workers with a conception of the
whole system, the mode seems to be the so-
cial division of labour.
Applying the argument of Smyth and Lo
introduced in Section 1 of Chapter Ⅱ, the
mode of coordination for the division of
labour corresponds to the organisational
learning paradigm, and, as they indicate,
Aoki's stylised Japanese mode of firm
organisation, or Best's entrepreneurial firm.
The employment system that supports the
coordination is characterized by a long-term
employment relationship, wage rises accord-
ing to seniority, and internal promotion
linked with contextual skill formation.
Workers within this system tend to be
loyal to their firm and stay a long time, and
are categorised by Osterman as an industrial
sub-system. Personnel are selected from
within the firm to fill vacancies. In the allo-
cation of human resources, instead of com-
peting with external applications in the
OLM, workers of the firm are promoted to
higher positions through the rank tourna-
ment system centrally administered by the
personnel management division.
Lastly, in order to guarantee the employ-
ment system, the financial environment for
corporate finance needs to be stable and man-
aged with a long-term view. The bank-
oriented financial system, which establishes
a stable and relational financial system be-
tween bank and firm or between firms, is
suitable for this. So, the financial system in-
fluences firm management by affecting the
employment system.
2: Market Oriented Financial System, OLM,
and Stylised U.S. Firms
On the other hand, the OLM's characteris-
tically professional and standardised skills
are easily evaluated by a third party and are
transferable to other firms. There is further-
more no link between skill formation and hi-
erarchical promotion. Human resources with
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this type of skill can be transacted in the oc-
cupational labour market (OLM), which is
external to the firm organisation. The prox-
imity of skill is weak and the speciality of
each worker is clearly defined. Knowledge is
shared through explicitly, for example
through documentation.
Under these conditions, labour mobility
between firms is high. To fill vacancies,
workers are hired from the occupational, and
hence external, labour market. So, a worker
belonging to a certain firm competes with
anonymous external workers. The wage is
determined by the job and, since each worker
specialises, it is easier to evaluate his or her
performance. The reward system takes the
form of payment by piece rate to balance the
wage and marginal production of workerson
a short-term basis. Workers tend to move
from firm to firm for better conditions.
This is categorised as a craft sub-system
by Osterman, in which the firm, with no need
to hold the same worker for a long period
and the ability to adjust staff to cope with
fluctuations of the economy, adopts the mar-
ket-oriented financial system, managing it
with a relatively short time horizon. This co-
ordination corresponds to the stylised U.S.
mode of firms,which is to say Best's hierar-
chical firm, characterized by a traditional in-
dividualist approach that responds to market
reactions.
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Table 2: Relationship between Economic System and Mode of Coordination
ILM OLM
Skill Formation
・Training within Firm
・Proximity of Skill is High
・Firm Specific Skill
Contextual Skill Formation
(Usually Linked with Promotion)
・Acquired outside Firm
・Proximity of Skill is Weak
・Standardised Skill and Transferable
(Not Linked with Promotion uness Ac-
quiring Different Skills)
Types of Labour (In
Osterman's (1983) terms
・Industrial Sub-System
(Loyalty for Organisation)
・Craft Sub-System
(Loyalty for his/her specialty)
Knowedge (or Infor-
mation) Shared
・Tacit Knowledge through Deep
Communication between Personnel
・Explicit Knowledge through Documen-
tation or Fomulae etc.
Employment System
・Long-Term Employment Relation-
ship
・Seniority Wage
・Internal Promotion
・Labour Mobility is High
・External Hiring to Fill Vacancies
・Wage is Determined by Job Category,
Percentage Pay
Allocation of Human
Resources
・Promotion of Labour within Firm
through Rank Tournament Sys-
tem
・Filling a Certain Vacancy through Hir-
ing Worker from Occupational Labour
Market
Financial System
・Bank Oriented Financial System
(High Debt/Equity Ratio, Stable
Shareholdings)
・Market Oriented Financial System
(Shareholdings by Market Investors)
Mode of Organisation
and Coordination
・Stylised Japanese Mode of Firm
Organisation of Entrepreneurial
Firm
・The Social Division of Labour
・Organisational Learning Para-
digm
・Stylised U.S. Mode of Firm Organisa-
tion or Hierarchical Firm
・Social Division of Labour by Profession-
als or Managers
・Detailed Division of Labour by Lower
Hierarchy
・Market-Hierarchical Paradigm
Suitable Environment ・Between Stable and Volatile ・Stable or Volatile
Source: Compiled from chapter Ⅱ and Ⅲ.
Since professional specialists and the
workers at the lower level of the hierarchy
are devoted to jobs without any conception of
final product, the mode of division of labour
in this case strongly represents the detailed
division of labour and can be analysed within
the market-hierarchies paradigm. Aoki's
(1995) evolved mode of firm organisation,
presented in section 2.2 of chapter Ⅱ, ex-
pands personnel's scope for promoting the
social division of labour by sharing whole
firm information.
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